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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

CITY OF MONTICELLO

|

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

i

LEE CHRISTENSEN,

|

Case No. 89-0163
Priority No. 2

Defendant and Petitioner.|
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGES BENCH,
DAVIDSON AND JACKSON, ON DISMISSAL
OF PETITIONER'S APPEAL
Lee Christensen, Pro Se
Petitioner
225 Hwy. 30 East
Evanston, Wyoming
Mailing:
c/o Norman Christensen
965 South 15th East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

L. Robert Anderson
Lyle R. Anderson
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent
P. 0. Box 27 5
Monticello, UT 84535

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction only to review the decision
of the Utah Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal.

Because the

validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance was not
raised in the justice court or the circuit court, the Court of
Appeals properly dismissed the appeal.

If the Court determines

that the Utah Court of Appeals improperly dismissed the appeal,
respondent is willing, for the sake of economy, that this Court
address the other issues raised by appellant,
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the right to appeal from the justice court to

the circuit court satisfy defendant's constitutional right of
appeal?
2.

Does arguing in circuit court that "the State of

Utah is not empowered to suspend what the State of Wyoming has
granted" constitute challenging the validity or constitutionality
of a statute or ordinance in the justice court when that argument
was not included in defendant's written motion filed in justice
court?
3.

Can the State of Utah suspend the privilege of the

holder of a Wyoming license certificate to drive in the State of
Utah if Wyoming recognizes Utah's right to do so?

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Interpretation of the following constitutional
provisions and statutes is determinative of this case:
Constitutional Provisions
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records and
judicial proceedings of every other State.
U. S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 1.
In criminal cases the accused shall have the
right to . . . appeal in all cases . . • .
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12.
Statutes
A person whose operatorfs license has been
suspended or revoked, as provided in this
act, and who drives any motor vehicle upon
the highways of this state while that license
is suspended or revoked, is guilty of a
crime, and upon conviction shall be punished
as provided for in Section 41-2-30.
Section 41-2-28, Utah Code (1985)
"License" means the privilege to operate a
motor vehicle over the highways of this
State.
Section 41-2-l(n), Utah Code (1985)
The case shall be tried anew in the circuit
court and the decision of the circuit court
is final except where the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance
is raised in the justice^'court.
Section 77-35-26 (13) (a), Utah Code (1989)
Except as expressly required by provisions of
this compact, nothing contained herein shall
be construed to affect the right of any party
state to apply any of its other laws relating
3

to licenses to drive to any person or
circumstance . . . .
Article VI, Driver's License Compact, Section 41-2-502, Utah Code
(1989) .
The following is the procedure of the issuing
jurisdiction:
(1) When issuing a citation for a traffic
violation, a peace officer shall issue the
citation to a motorist who possesses a driver
license issued by a party jurisdiction and
shall not . . . require the motorist to post
collateral to secure appearance if the
officer receives the motorist's personal
recognizance that he or she will comply with
the terms of the citation.
(3) Upon failure of a motorist to comply
with the terms of a traffic citation, the
appropriate official shall report the failure
to comply to the licensing authority of the
jurisdiction in which the traffic citation
was issued. . . .
(5) The licensing authority of the issuing
jurisdiction may not suspend the privilege of
a motorist for whom a report has been
transmitted.
Nonresident Violator Compact, Section 41-2-603, Utah Code (1989)
(b) Upon receipt of certification that the
driving privilege of a resident of this state
has been suspended or revoked in any other
state pursuant to a law providing for its
suspension or revocation for failure to
deposit security for the payment of judgments
arising out of a motor vehicle accident; or
for failure to deposit both security and
proof of financial responsibility, under
circumstances which would require the
division to suspend a nonresident's operating
privilege had the accident occurred in this
state, the division shall suspend the license
of the resident and all of his registrations.
Suspension shall continue until the resident
furnishes evidence of his compliance with the
4

law of the other state relating to the
deposit of security and until the resident
files proof of financial responsibility if
required by the law.
Section 31-9-204, Wyoming Statutes (1973).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Defendant and appellant Lee Christensen ("Christensen")
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Judgment and Order
of Probation entered in the Twelfth (now Seventh) Circuit Court
of San Juan County, Utah, Honorable Bruce K. Halliday presiding,
on April 21, 1988, after a trial on March 31, 1988.

Christensen

was convicted of violating an ordinance of the City of Monticello
(the "City") adopting Section 41-2-28, Utah Code (1985)1 on
September 3, 1987, by driving a motor vehicle within the City
while his license was suspended or revoked.

Christensen had

appealed to the circuit court from a conviction for the same
offense before the Monticello Justice Court.
The Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction on February 23, 1989, City of Monticello v.
Christensen, 769 P.2d 853 (Utah App. 1989), and denied
Christensen1s petition for rehearing on March 22, 1989. His

At the time of the violation, the City had adopted by
ordinance the Utah Traffic Laws in effect in 1985.
Though
Christensen was technically convicted of violating the ordinance,
this brief will refer to the statutes incorporated by the City's
ordinance.
5

petition for certiorari was filed and served on April 24, 1989.
3
This Court granted certiorari on June 12, 1989.
Statement of Facts
The City does not agree with Christensen1s Statement of
Facts.

Christensen has not furnished a transcript of the

proceedings in the circuit court and the assertions in his brief
are not evidence.
Christensen1s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in
Utah was suspended for one year on February 5, 1987. That
suspension was for failure to provide security for damages caused
by Christensen, as an uninsured motorist, on October 2, 1986.
Christensen was driving within the City on September 3, 1987.
These are the only relevant facts.
nor did he call any witnesses.

Christensen did not testify,

He was permitted to introduce a

copy of his Wyoming driving record, which showed that he had been
4
issued a Wyoming license certificate on July 17, 1984.
Filing of the petition was due on April 21, 1989, according
to the City's calculations, and filing on April 24, 1989, should
have been refused pursuant to Rule 45(b) , Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.
3
For some reason, the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
requested the record from the Seventh Circuit Court, rather than
from the Utah Court of Appeals, as Rule 48, Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court, would seem to require.
4
The City does not agree that Christensen had a valid Wyoming
license, or that the possession of a Wyoming license certificate
creates the presumption of Wyoming residency, as the Court of
Appeals stated. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853,
n. 1 (Utah App. 1989) . Christensen has never received mail in
Wyoming since this case was filed, and his Wyoming address is a
6

There is no evidence in the record that Christensen
challenged the validity or constitutionality of a statute in the
5
justice court. His Demand for Dismissal filed in the circuit
court argues that "the State of Utah is not empowered to suspend
what the State of Wyoming has granted. . . . "
Demand for Dismissal

However, his

filed in justice court, identical in all

other respects, does not contain such an argument.
Christensen also asserts that he is entitled to special
treatment because he appears pro se.

In this connection, the

City notes that Christensen may have qualified for court
7
appointed counsel, but instead filed a Demand for Counsel,
demanding that he be allowed counsel of his own choosing,
stating:
Although the defendant fully intends to
defend himself and has no need for someone to
speak for him or to represent him, the
defendant demands that he be able to have
someone of his own choice to aid with counsel
and other functions of trial.

recreational vehicle court.
5
Reproduced in Appendix.
Reproduced in Appendix.
7
Reproduced in Appendix.
8.
It became evident at both trials that the person of
Christensen's choice was his sister, who is apparently not a
lawyer, but a legal assistant. The City believes that the sister
is responsible for preparation of all documents filed in this case.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Christensen1s right of appeal was satisfied by the
trial de novo before the circuit court.

The validity or

constitutionality of a statute was not raised in either the
justice court or the circuit court, thus depriving the Utah Court
of Appeals of jurisdiction.

Christensen1s constitutional Full

Faith and Credit Clause claim should not be addressed because it
was raised for the first time on appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

Assuming that the merits of Christensen1s arguments

about Utah's power to suspend his driving license or privilege
are addressed, they should be rejected.
ARGUMENT
I.

CHRISTENSEN1S RIGHT OF APPEAL WAS
SATISFIED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT
TRIAL.

Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution
guarantees the accused a right to appeal in all cases.

Prior to

its amendment effective July 1, 1985, Article VIII, Section 9, of
the Utah Constitution clearly provided that, for cases
9
originating m justice courts, this right was satisfied
right of appeal to district courts,10 except where the
constitutionality or validity of a statute was involved.

by the
None of

State v. Lyte, 75 Utah 283, 284 P.1006 (1930).
10
Appellate jurisdiction over justice courts has since been
transferred to circuit courts. Section 78-4-7.5, Utah Code (1989).
8

the cases decided under pre-1985 law suggests that the trial de
novo before the district courts does not constitute an appeal. 11
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution now
provides that "there shall be in all cases an appeal of right
from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cases."

In this case, the justice court

was the court of original jurisdiction, and the circuit court was
the court with appellate jurisdiction.

Christensen1s

constitutional right of appeal was satisfied.
II.

CHRISTENSEN1S APPEAL TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS WAS PROPERLY
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

Section 77-35-26(13), Utah Code (1989) provides that
where an appeal is taken to the circuit court from a judgment
rendered in justice court:
[T]he decision of the circuit court is final
except where the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is raised in
the justice court.
Christensen contends that he challenged the validity
and constitutionality of a statue in the courts below.

However,

the only part of the record remotely suggesting such a challenge
is his written argument to the circuit court that "the State of
Utah is not empowered to suspend what the State of Wyoming has

11

See, e.g. State v. Van Gervan, 647 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1983);
State v. Munger, 642 P.2d 721 (Utah 1982).
9

granted."
The Utah Court of Appeals properly concluded that
Christensen had not challenged the constitutionality or validity
of a statute or ordinance in the justice court.

He did not

identify any statute or ordinance as invalid, nor did he identify
the constitutional provision on which he relied.

His challenge,

as far as could be determined, was actually based on the
statutory interpretation argument that Utah could not suspend
Christensen1s Utah license since he did not have a Utah license
to suspend. 13
Christensen1s failure to identify the faulty statute or
the constitutional provision on which he relied deprived both the
justice and circuit courts of the opportunity to consider and
rule on a possibly dispositive question.

The seemingly endless
14
litigation that followed may have been avoided.
Challenges to suspension of non-resident driving
privileges based on the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection

This argument to the circuit court was not included in the
Demand for Dismissal filed in justice court. One must therefore
conclude that this argument was not raised in the justice court.
13

See New Hampshire v. French, 117 N.H. 785, 378 A.2d 1377
(1977), cited by Christensen in his brief.
14
The City may also have decided, if the Full Faith and Credit
challenge had been raised in justice or circuit court, to abandon
prosecution of this case. The litigation resources of the City of
Monticello are limited, as evidenced by the fact that its attorneys
have acted without compensation in this matter since certiorari was
granted.
10

Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause were all
addressed and rejected in Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 611
(1915).

Since then, the right of states to suspend non-resident
driving privilege has been routinely upheld. 15 As far as the
City can determine, a challenge based on the full Faith and
Credit Clause has never been decided.

The Utah Court of Appeals

properly deferred ruling on this claim until a case arrives in
which the issue is properly presented.
III. UTAH HAS THE POWER TO SUSPEND
CHRISTENSEN'S LICENSE OR PRIVILEGE
TO DRIVE IN UTAH.
It is clear that Christensen*s challenge to his
conviction is based primarily on statutory interpretation,
especially in the justice and circuit courts.

Even now,

Christensen relies on a case from New Hampshire holding that a
non-resident whose operating privileges have been revoked cannot
be convicted of driving on a suspended license, since driving
16
privilege and license are not synonymous.
This reliance is
misplaced.
In New Hampshire v. French, the driver, a resident of

District of Columbia v. Fred, 281 U.S. 49 (1930);
Connecticut v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp. 26, 176 A. 2d 66 (Conn. App.
1961); People v. Matas, 200 Cal. App. 3d, 264 Cal. Rptr. 627
(1988); State v. Harkness, 189 Kan. 581, 370 P.2d 100 (1962); State
v. Dalton, 13 Wash. App. 94, 533 P.2d 864 (1975); State v.
Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 (1983) review denied 295
Or. 846, 671 P.2d 1176 (1983).
16

New Hampshire v. French, 117 N.H. 785, 378 A.2d 1377 (1977) .
11

New York, was convicted of driving under the influence and her
right to operate a vehicle in New Hampshire was revoked for 90
days.

The Court held that she could not be convicted of driving

while her license was revoked because her New York license was
not revoked, only her right to operate in New Hampshire.

The

Court noted:
Other states have statutes . . . proscribing
only driving after suspension or revocation
of one's license, but . . . definfe] license
to include "any non resident operating
privilege." Our legislature may draft a
statute similar or identical to the ones
above in order to cover cases like-the one
before us. The judiciary may not.
The Utah Legislature has drafted such a statute.
Section 41-2-l(n), Utah Code (1985), now Section 41-2-102(9),
Utah Code (1989) defines license as "the privilege to operate a
motor vehicle in this state."

Section 41-2-28 can thus be

restated to say that a person whose privilege to operate a motor
vehicle in this state (whether or not evidenced by a license
certificate) has been suspended or revoked, and who drives any
motor vehicle upon the highways of this state is guilty of a
crime.
The rule of law applicable to this case is stated in
Connecticut v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp., 176 A.2d 66 (Conn. App.
1961):

Id., 117 N.H. 785 at 788.
12

Donald Roy, Massachusetts operator, by virtue
of §14-39 is entitled to the rights and
privileges accorded to Donald J. Roy,
Connecticut operator, a person whose right to
operate a motor vehicle in Connecticut has
been suspended. Equivalent right does not
mean additional right, and the provisions of
§14-39 were not intended to be, and cannot
be, used as a back door means of obtaining
restoration of a suspended license.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prohibit a
suspension of non-resident driving privileges under the
circumstances of this case.

Though Utah may not deny to non-

residents licensed by their states the right to drive on Utah
Highways simply because they are non-residents, it ought to be
able to, and indeed should, require that they comply with Utah's
traffic laws.

Christensen failed to comply with Utah's law

requiring him to furnish security for damages caused by an
accident in which he was at fault and uninsured, and his
privilege to drive in Utah was consequently suspended.
The very Wyoming statute cited by Christensen in his
brief shows that Wyoming recognizes the rights of other states to
suspend the privileges of Wyoming residents and license holders
to drive in those other states.

Section 31-9-204, Wyoming

Statutes (1973) requires Wyoming officials to suspend the license

Connecticut v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp. 26, 176 A.2d 66 at 68
(Conn. App. 1961) . See also People v. Matas, 200 Cal. App. 3d, 264
Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988); State v. Harkness, 189 Kan. 581, 370 P.2d
100 (1962) ; State v. Dalton, 13 Wash. App. 94, 533 P.2d 864 (1975) ;
State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 (1983) review
denied 295 Or. 846 671 P.2d 1176 (1983).
13

of a Wyoming resident whose privilege to drive in another state
is suspended by that state for failure to deposit security,
precisely the situation in this case. 19
In State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380
(1983), review denied, 295 Or. 846,671 P.2d 1176 (1983), the
Oregon Court of Appeals noted that:
"The right of a state to regulate the use of
its highways by nonresidents in order to
protect public safety has been recognized
almost fromQthe time the automobile was
invented."
but that:
[W]e are not aware of any cases dealing with
a full faith and credit challenge to the
revoking state's authority.
* n Justesen, the Court declined to address the Full
Faith and Credit challenge because both Oregon and Washington
(the resident state) were parties to the Drivers License Compact.
Citing Article V(2) of the Compact (found in Section 41-2-502,
Utah Code (1989)) the Court concluded that Washington recognized
the right of Oregon to suspend the Oregon driving privileges of
Washington residents.

While Wyoming was apparently not a member

The City has no idea why this suspension by Wyoming did not
occur. Perhaps it was because Wyoming was not then a member of the
Driverfs License Compact and means for communication between Utah
and Wyoming were poor.
State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 at 383
(1983) .
21

Id., 665 P.2d 380 at 383.
14

of the Drivers License Compact in 1987, its law clearly
recognized the right of other states to suspend the non-resident
driving privileges of Wyoming residents for failure to comply
22
with financial responsibility laws.

This Court, like the

Oregon Court of Appeal, need not consider the Full Faith and
Credit question, because the Wyoming license certificate,
necessarily limited by Wyoming law, was issued subject to Utah's
right to suspend the appurtenant non-resident operating
privileges.
IV.

NOTHING IN UTAH LAW PROHIBITS THIS
SUSPENSION.

Christensen cites the Drivers1 License Compact,
Sections 41-2-501 et seq., Utah Code (1989) and the Nonresident
Violator Compact, Sections 41-2-601 et seq., Utah Code (1989) for
the proposition that Utah cannot suspend his non-resident
operating privileges.

Wyoming had not adopted the Driver1s

License Compact at the time of Christensen1s conviction.

Even if

applicable, nothing in the Drivers1 License Compact declares that
Utah may not suspend or revoke nonresident operator privileges.
To the contrary, the Drivers1 License Compact specifically
provides in Article VI that "nothing contained herein shall . . .
affect the right of any party state to apply any of its other

Section 31-9-204, Wyoming Statute (1973).
15

laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance
it

Christensen asserts that Section 41-2-603(5) of the
Nonresident Violator Compact bars Utah from suspending his
license.

There is no evidence that Wyoming was a part of this

compact at the time of conviction.

Even if applicable, a reading

of the entire section makes clear that the report referred to is
a report that a motorist has not complied with the terms of a
traffic citation.

In other words, a compact state may not

suspend the driving privilege of a nonresident motorist for
failing to appear in response to a citation, but must instead
report to the jurisdiction of residence, which will initiate a
suspension action.

This section does not restrict suspensions

for violation of traffic laws.
CONCLUSION
Christensen1s right of appeal was satisfied by the
circuit court trial de novo.

The Utah Court of Appeals properly

dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

If the merits of

his challenge to his conviction are reached, they must be
rejected, because Utah has the right to, and properly did,
suspend his privilege to drive in this state.
should therefore be affirmed.

16

The conviction

DATED this IQJU day of August, 1989.
_^—^/r-t

/r^^LA^L^

L. Robert Anderson
Lyle R. Anderson
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C.
Attorneys for City
P. 0. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent to the defendant by first-class
mail, postage prepaid, on the

day of August, 1989, addressed

as follows:
Mr. Lee Hatfield Christensen
c/o Norman Christensen
965 South 15th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

<Li. A*h^-

lsy&& R. Anderson
LCHRIS.BRF
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Lee Christensen
225I%30Rpst
B/anstcn, Wyoming
nailing
C?0 Neman ChrlstaTsen
965 South 15th East
Salt Lake City , Utah 841Q5

TO THE JUSTICE CF THE PEACE COURT OF MMTCELLO, COUNIY OF SAN JUAN, STATE OF UTAH

City of San Juan,
Paintiff

]
(
;
(1
]
I

v•
Lee Christensen,
Defendant

DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL
Case No. 21786

Comes now the defendant to demand that the charges in the
above entitled case be dismissed against him.
Defendant states to support motion,

defendant is charged

with DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, UC 41-2-28, as adopted by Ordinanc
in the city of Monticello.
defendant.

This Code does not apply to the

The defendant is not a resident of the state of Utah

and has not had his Utah License suspended.
Furthermore, defendant has now, did have at time of citation
a Valid Wyoming License(Copy of Extract enclosed)., and is a
residendent of Wyoming.

According to Infomation, and Discovery,

the prosecution is basing it's case on a letter from the Dept.
of Public Safty, wherein it states that defendant's "Priveledge"
is suspended.

This only means that defendant may not have a Utah

Driver's License until the time specified is over.

Defendant has

not applied for a Utah Driver's License.
Therefore defendant demands dismissal of charges.

Dated this 15th day of November, 1987.

Respectfully Suraitted

LEE OIIRIOTENOEN

ORAL ARGUEMENT DEMANDED.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do certify that the foregoing Demand for Dissmissal, were
sent certified mail to the prosecuting attorney, Mr. Lyel Anderso
P. 0. Box 275, Monticello, Utah 84-535-

Lee Christensen,

ii/n/87

Lee Christensen
225 hwy 30 East
Evanston, Wyoming
mailing- c/o Norman Christensen
965 South 15th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
IN THE TWELTH CIRCUIT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, MONTICELLO DEPARTMENT

CITY OF MONTICELLO,
Plaintiff
V.
LEE CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant

(
I
j
i
|

DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL
Criminal No. 88-CR-004.

I

Comes now the defedant to demand that the charges in the
above entitled case be dismissed against him.
Defendant states to support motion, that defendant is charged
with DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, UC 41-2-28, as adopted by Ordinace
in the city of Monticello.
Defendant is not a resident of Utah, but of Wyoming, and
does not have a Utah Drivers license.

Further, he does have, and

did have a valid Wyoming license, which was ented into evidence
in the Justice Court.
According to Information, Prosecution is basing it's case
on a letter from the Dept. of Public Safety, wherin it states that
the defendant's "Privelege" is suspended.

This only means that

the defendant may not apply for a Utah Lisence until that suspension
is over.

Since the defendant is not applying for an Utah Lisence

and since the State of Utah is not empowered to suspend what
the State of Wyoming has granted, the defendant demands that the
charges against him be dropped.
ORAL ARGUEMENT DEMANDED.
Dated this 22nd day of March, 1988.

Respectfully Submitted,

AlXhu<r

Lee Christensen
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do certify theat the foregoing Demand for Dismissal, as
well as Demand for Cousel, were sent certified mail to the
prosecuting attorney, Mr. Lyle AndersonP.O. Box275. Monticello,
Utah 84535.
^
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Lee Christensen
c/o NormAN Christensen
965 So. 15th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Residence 225 Hwy 30 East
Evanston, Wyoming
IN THE TWELTH CIRCUIT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, MONTICELLO DEPARTMENT
THE CITY OF MONTICELLO,
Plaintiff

)
DEMAND FOR COUNSEL

V.
LEE CHRISTENSEN
Defendant

[
]
i

CRIMINAL NO. 88-CR-004

Comes now the defendant to demand that he be allowed counsel, of his own choising.

Although the defendant fully intends

to defend himself and has no need for someone to speak for him,
or to represent him, the defendant demands that he be able to
have someone of his own choice to aid him with counsel and other
functions of the trial.
Defendant claims this right under the Constitution of the
United States, and asserts that this aid is imperitive if he is
to defend himself to the best of his ability.

Dated this 21st day of March, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Lee Christensen

